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I’d like to echo John’s thoughts about Vítor and to thank Vítor for including me in this 
conference.  Like John I've had many discussions with Vítor in which I would turn up in his office 
at 4 o'clock for a 15-minute discussion and after an hour and a half we'd still be talking about 
economics. If I'd known that we could also have had a discussion about music I'm sure we 
would still be there now. 
 
Let me start out by saying that, in a 10-minute discussion it's difficult to do justice to everything 
that's in John's very interesting paper. I'm going to draw on what I take to be three themes. The 
first theme, that John did not say a huge amount about, is that clearly some of the DSGE models 
we've been working with have not been particularly successful.  
 
Secondly, John mentioned a couple of people that he's found very insightful. One is David 
Hendry and one is Joe Stiglitz and I echo that sentiment. In my first job at the University of 
Toronto I went to see Joe Stiglitz give a talk. At the time, I didn't really have a clear thesis topic.  
My thesis ended up being inspired by that talk; so the notion that there are some very 
important insights in what we call the information revolution in economics is one that I endorse 
wholeheartedly.   
 
Finally, one of the things I'd like to talk about in this discussion is what we can learn from the 
information revolution.  My view is that what we can learn is perhaps even a little more radical 
than some of the things that John drew attention to. 
 
John provided some insights from his own empirical work and I'm going to complement those 
insights. I will agree with some of them and provide what I believe are some important ideas, 
particularly for policymaking, when we think about the relationship between inflation and 
unemployment. There are a few themes that I'll talk about. The first one, that I've alluded to 
already, is exactly how should we think about introducing information theory into 
macroeconomics.  
 
I believe that there are two ways in which information theory is important. One is connected 
with the asset markets and the other is connected with the labour market.  My view is that the 
lessons we should be taking away from information theory go a great deal beyond the idea that 
shocks become amplified.  In my own work, I've gone back to take what I consider to be an 
important idea that was in Keynes's General Theory and which became forgotten:  Market 
economies are not self-correcting.  We may get stuck with unemployment rates which could be 
20% for decades or 5% for decades. The way we ought to think about that in the language of 
modern general equilibrium theory is that there are not just multiple equilibria; there is, 
potentially, a continuum of equilibria.   
 
If you run with that idea it leads you to think about the progress we've made in the empirics of 
Phillips curves.  I'm going to make the argument that there's a really important 
question that follows from the fact that there is a huge amount of persistence in the 
unemployment rate. In fact, I'll show you evidence which suggests that it's difficult to 
distinguish innovations to the unemployment rate in the U.S. from a random walk.  The 
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question then becomes, is persistence of the unemployment rate caused by supply-side factors 
or is it caused by demand-side factors? According to the supply side view, the natural rate of 
unemployment is moving around. According to the demand-side view, the actual 
unemployment rate is moving around in a set of possible multiple equilibria and the natural 
rate of unemployment, as usually defined, is a meaningless concept. If this second view is 
correct, there is the potential for monetary policy not just to get us back to the natural rate of 
unemployment more quickly but to permanently influence the steady state unemployment 
rate.  
 
 
Chart 1: Unemployment and Wealth During the Great Depression1 
 
I'm going to show you some evidence here from my own work on the connection between 
financial markets and labour markets. In Chart 1, the solid line is a measure of the real 
value of stock market wealth in the 1920s in the United States.  The line marked with circles is 
the unemployment rate. This is measured on the right axis on an inverted scale that varies 
between 0 percent and 30 percent. Notice that movements in the asset markets precede 
movements in the unemployment rate. This chart is suggestive that there is a causal connection 
that runs from asset prices to the labour market. 
 
Now let’s examine some more recent data.  Chart 2 shows what happened in the Great 
Recession.  This picture is similar to Chart 1 although the magnitudes are not as great. The right 
scale runs from 4 percent to 12 percent rather than from 0 to 30 percent. However, the notion  
                                                     
1 Source: FRED II and author’s calculations. 
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Chart 2: Unemployment and the Stock Market During the Great Recession2 
 
 
Chart 3:  
Chart 3: Unemployment and the Stock Market in Post-WWII Data3 
                                                     
2 3 Source: FRED II and author’s calculations. 
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of a causal mechanism between falls in wealth and increases in unemployment is, I think, a 
relatively easy one to take away from these charts. 
 
One might believe that these two historical periods are special. But that is not the case. Chart 3 
illustrates data from 1945 up through 2011 showing the connection between unemployment 
and the stock market. The stock market is measured as the logarithm of a real measure of the 
S&P 500 index. The transformed unemployment rate is measured as a logistic transformation of 
the logarithm of the reported unemployment rate. I chose these transformations to ensure that 
both variables can vary between minus infinity and plus infinity. A careful analysis of the 
properties of these variables reveals that they are each well modelled individually as random 
walks.4 But a linear combination of the unemployment rate and the stock market is a stationary 
variable. Technically, we say that they are cointegrated. Further, the cointegrating relationship 
between unemployment and the stock market has been quite stable over the entire post-war 
period. 
 
 
Chart 4: The Rocking Horse Model5 
 
In my view, the connection between the stock market and the unemployment rate is causal and 
it operates through a demand-side mechanism and not a supply-side mechanism.  
 
                                                     
4 More precisely, they each have a non-stationary I(1) component. See Hamilton (1994) for a discussion of this 
concept and of the related concept of cointegration. 
5 Source: Prosperity for All: Figure 8.3. Used by permission. 
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Next I'm going to show you some toy models to help you think about what that statement 
entails. The first model, I call this a rocking horse model, is the kind that characterizes almost all 
of modern DSG theory. The rocking horse model is illustrated in Chart 4. This model has the 
property that, after a shock, the economy returns back to its growth path.  The dynamics of a 
rocking horse model is well described by a vector autoregression in which there is a stable 
point or a stable growth path to which the economy returns.   
 
Chart 5 illustrates an alternative theory that I call the windy boat model. In the windy boat 
model, the economy is like a boat on the ocean with a broken rudder. The dynamics of the 
windy boat model can be described by a process that physicists call hysteresis. If there is a 
shock to the economy, instead of returning back to the same growth path, the economy returns 
back to a different growth path as in the illustration in Chart 5.  
 
 
Chart 5: The Windy Boat Model6 
 
The interesting question is: Is the economy more like the rocking horse or is it more like the 
windy boat?  In the windy boat example, instead of there being a point that the economy 
returns to there is a connected set of points. There are many steady-state equilibrium 
unemployment rates, any one of which could act as a rest point for the system.  
 
                                                     
6 Source: Prosperity for All. Figure 8.3. Used by permission. 
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Chart 6: U.S. Data Since the Great Recession7 
 
 
Chart 7: Comparing the models with data 
 
                                                     
7 Source. Prosperity for All. Figure 8.5. Used by permission. 
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Chart 6 illustrates what happened in the U.S. data after the Great Recession. This picture, in my 
view, is a lot closer to my windy boat model than to the rocking horse model.  There is a saying 
that I learned in the United States which I have illustrated in Chart 7.  If it looks like a duck, 
swims like a duck and quacks like a duck; it probably is a duck. 
 
The conclusions I take away from this discussion are twofold. First, there is a great deal wrong 
with the DSGE models we've been using for the past fifty years and, second, we can learn from 
the information revolution. But the kinds of things we need to learn from the information 
revolution are likely to have more profound effects than the simple tweaks that too many New 
Keynesian economists continue to make to New Keynesian DSGE models.  The economy is not a 
stable self-correcting system: It is characterized by instability and hysteresis. These conclusions 
lead to a key question and this is where John's work on the dynamics of unemployment and 
inflation come in.  
 
I personally am quite critical of Phillips curves. I have long argued that they haven't existed in 
data since Phillips wrote the first paper on the topic in 1958.  On the other side of this 
argument, there are people like Bob Gordon (2013) who has argued that the Phillips curve is 
alive and well and that it is possible to estimate a stable Phillips curve in post-WWII data. But 
the way that Bob does this is by assuming that the natural rate of unemployment itself is a 
random walk. Like the hysteresis view, this assumption also implies that the unemployment 
rate has a non-stationary component. But when non-stationarity comes from supply-side shifts 
in the supply of labour, there is not much that policy can, or should, do to correct the situation.  
I’m not sure where John stands on this issue; but in my view it is one of the most important 
issues for the future of macroeconomics.  
 
The question we need to ask ourselves is this: Is the non-stationary component of the 
unemployment rate due to a non-stationary component of the structure of labour markets that 
causes changes in the natural rate of unemployment to move in unpredictable ways? Or, is it 
due to demand side variables that we can potentially influence through monetary policy? These 
two explanations have very different consequences for the way economists and policy makers 
should think about operationalizing not just monetary policy, but also fiscal policy going 
forwards. 
 
To conclude. I enjoyed reading John's paper enormously and, in this discussion, I've provided 
some complementary ideas that I have elaborated on in more depth in my recent book, 
Prosperity for All: How to Prevent Financial Crises.   
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